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CIA 4 IRAN (Takman I & II)  
CIA 101 TURNER, Adm.  
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# Verification Arguments Aren't Only Technical

By RICHARD BURT

Washington — When the political upheaval in Iran accelerated six months ago, few American officials anticipated that one of the serious consequences would be to cast deep doubt on the ability of the Carter Administration to persuade the Senate to approve a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty with the Soviet Union.

But last week, as an intense, confusing controversy boiled up over United States ability to verify Moscow's compliance with the projected arms accord, the implications of the Iranian revolution became only too clear. At the core of the dispute was whether the loss of two electronic listenings posts in northern Iran — known as Takman I and Takman II — had dealt a fatal blow to the Central Intelligence Agency's capabilities to police SALT.

Until the agency's technicians were forced to abandon them in February, these supersecret intelligence posts had been, in the words of one official, a "bay window" on the Soviet Union's main base for testing intercontinental missiles 600 miles to the north at Turatam. Equipped with huge antennas, the Iranian stations intercepted

radio signals broadcast by Soviet missiles during test firings. These signals yielded important clues about Moscow's growing strategic arsenal.

The loss of the stations led some senators, including John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, to suggest that the Administration could not monitor provisions in the treaty which would ban significant improvements to American and Soviet rockets. Earlier this month, the White House undertook a quiet campaign to assure Mr. Glenn and others that it was already devising a plan to compensate for the Iranian posts, including the use of modified U-2 spy planes that would monitor missile tests on flights near the Soviet Union's southwestern border.

This campaign took a severe blow last week when the Administration's assessment of verification capabilities appeared to be challenged by Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. In secret testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, the director apparently expressed the view said that it would take about five years for the United States to fully replace the Iranian sites with a combination of spy planes, new ground stations and advanced satellites.

From Georgia, Jody Powell, the President's press secretary, told reporters the testimony had been misrepresented and lashed out at senators for divulging sensitive intelligence details. Other White House aides privately voiced annoyance over Admiral Turner's apparent reluctance to back the Administration on verification.

On the defensive, the White House marched out its leading arms expert, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, who asserted that the Soviet missile data crucial for monitoring treaty compliance could be regained within a year. "But considering the variety of our monitoring techniques and also considering the time it takes for the Soviets to test missiles," Mr. Brown said, he was "convinced that we're going to be able to verify a SALT agreement from the moment it is signed and ratified."

Mr. Brown's timely intervention helped re-

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